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In his brilliant book, The Making of the English Working Class,
E.P. Thompson, the author of one of these volumes and a contributor
to the other, underlined "the paradox" in 18th-century England of
"a bloody penal code" existing "alongside a liberal ... administration
and interpretation of the laws." This paradox raised a problem for
Marxist historians like Thompson: While they portrayed the 18th-
century English legal system as an instrument of class repression by a
property-holding Whig elite, they nevertheless felt compelled to con-
cede that "[a] quite surprising consensus of opinion," among gentry
and common people alike, had successfully opposed establishment of a
repressive system of police. "[T]he conviction that the rule of law was
the distinguishing inheritance of the 'free-born Englishman', and was
his defence against arbitrary power, was upheld even by the [English]
Jacobins." And as Thompson perceived, this system of law actually
served to restrain the intrusion of arbitrary authority "upon personal
or property rights."
In an important and perceptive essay in Albion's Fatal Tree,
Douglas Hay illuminates and explains this basic paradox of 18th-
century English law.2 Hay argues that "the criminal law, more than
any other social institution, made it possible to govern eighteenth-
century England without a police force and without a large army. The
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ideology of the law was crucial in sustaining the hegemony of the
English ruling class. "'
Hay's emphasis on "legal ideology" as a major instrument of class
domination marks a major departure in the neo-Marxist understanding
of the role of law. Hay recognizes that "terror alone could never have
accomplished those ends." 4 Indeed, despite an increasingly bloody
penal code, which imposed the death penalty "to protect every con-
ceivable kind of property from theft or malicious damage," "[t]he avail-
able evidence suggests that, compared to some earlier periods, the
eighteenth-century criminal law claimed few lives."' A series of dis-
cretionary institutions running from prosecutorial discretion to the
widespread use of pardons by the Crown saved many offenders from
the gallows.
But amidst the evidence he has gathered of modest state powers of
enforcement as well as of a major disparity between a harsh law on
the books and a more lenient law in practice, how can Hay still main-
tain that "more than any other social institution" the criminal law
sustained the "hegemony" of class rule? To deal with that problem,
he focuses upon the use of criminal law as one of the "chief ideological
instruments" of the ruling class, an instrument that combined "terror"
with "discretion" to mold "the consciousness by which the many sub-
mitted to the few.'"6
It is impossible in this short review to convey fully the detail, the
texture, and the subtlety of Hay's demonstration of how the prevailing
legal ideology combined "majesty, justice and mercy" to ensure class
rule.7 Briefly, Hay contends that the use of legal ideology "as an
instrument of authority" also made it "a breeder of values" so that
"English justice became [an] important focus of beliefs about the
nation and the social order.""
The punctilious attention to forms, the dispassionate and legalis-
tic exchanges between counsel and the judge, argued that those
administering and using the laws submitted to its rules. The law
thereby became something more than the creature of a ruling
class-it became a power with its own claims, higher than those of
prosecutor, lawyers, and even the great scarlet-robed assize judge
himself.9
3. Id. at 56.
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Hay thus argues that the "rule of law" as an ideology required the
English ruling classes to accept a degree of self-limitation in order to
govern effectively. More importantly, he argues that use of legal
ideology as a means of social control required that it be believed and
acted upon by both higher and lower classes. Through a process of
internalization the system of laws "became something more than the
creature of a ruling class."'10
Hay's important essay is part of a more general reconsideration of
the function of law that has been going on among neo-Marxist his-
torians during the past decade. As the dogmatic shadows cast by
Stalinism and the Cold War have gradually dissipated, Marxists have
finally begun to move away from those simplistic slogans by which
thought was dismissed as mere "ideology" and by which law was
treated contemptuously as a mere "superstructure" that simply "re-
flected" class relations." A recent interpretation of Marx's political
theory, for example, has convincingly demonstrated that Marx himself
consistently asserted a regular interaction between "substructure" and
"superstructure" through which thought, values, and social arrange-
ments actually do affect consciousness and, ultimately, history.,2
Similarly, in his recent book on slavery, America's leading Marxist
historian, Eugene Genovese, has devoted an entire section to discussing
"The Hegemonic Function of the Law," in which he has perceptively
argued that legal systems are relatively autonomous:' 3
Only possession of public power can discipline a class as a whole,
and through it, the other classes of society. The juridical system
may become, then, not merely an expression of class interest, nor
even merely an expression of the willingness of the rulers to
mediate with the ruled; it may become an instrument by which
the advanced section of the ruling class imposes its viewpoint upon
the class as a whole and the wider society. The law must discipline
the ruling class and guide and educate the masses. To accomplish
these tasks it must manifest a degree of evenhandedness sufficient
to compel social conformity; it must, that is, validate itself ethically
in the eyes of the several classes, not just the ruling class. 14
10. Id.
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E.P. Thompson's latest book, Whigs and Hunters, stands in a per-
plexing relationship to these recent neo-Marxist contributions to the
understanding of the function of law. Except for an excellent theoret-
ical postscript on "The Rule of Law," which I will discuss in a
moment, Whigs and Hunters is a surprisingly disappointing book. Its
immediate purpose is to explain the origin of the Black Act of 1723
by which Parliament, without so much as a pause, substantially ex-
tended capital punishment to include a number of relatively petty
offenses. Although the Black Act was initially drafted to punish
"blacking" (i.e., poaching) in royal forests under various disguises,
including blackened faces, it was almost immediately expanded by
judicial interpretation to cover other crimes never contemplated at
its passage. The Act, Thompson writes, "signalled the onset of the
flood-tide of eighteenth-century retributive justice,"'15 which sub-
stantially increased the brutality of the English penal code.
Thompson's discussion of the passage of the Act leads him in
characteristic fashion to assemble a wealth of social and economic
detail about the forest economy and the people who occupied it, as
well as about the general political climate under Walpole which made
passage of the Act possible. Thompson's most general argument is that
the Act represented the culmination of a social and economic struggle
through which a "customary" economy of forest dwellers was destroyed
and replaced by a market-oriented regime based on "capitalist prop-
erty rights." In Thompson's view "[t]he forest conflict was, in origin,
a conflict between users and exploiters."'16 "During the eighteenth
century one legal decision after another signalled that the lawyers had
become converted to the notions of absolute property ownership,"
which, in turn, signaled the destruction of the customary "use-right"
whose "messy complexities" were abhorred by the law.' 7
Unlike his earlier book, however, the ratio of interesting theoretical
generality to undigested historical detail is too small. Whigs and
Hunters constantly dwells on minor facts without indicating why we
would care to know about them. Indeed, one is finally unconvinced
that the entire subject has yielded enough general insight to have
justified Thompson's prodigious research.
From his postscript on "The Rule of Law," one senses that Thomp-
son himself doubted whether he had succeeded:
15. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 23 (1975).
16. Id. at 244-45.
17. Id. at 241.
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I sit here in my study, at the age of fifty, the desk and floor piled
high with five years of notes, xeroxes, rejected drafts, the clock
once again moving into the small hours, and see myself, in a lucid
instant, as an anachronism. Why have I spent these years trying to
find out what could, in its essential structures, have been known
without any investigation at all?' 8
Thompson attempts an answer. He accepts, on the one hand, "some
part of the Marxist-structural critique; indeed, some parts of this study
have confirmed the class-bound and mystifying functions of the law."
On the other hand, he "reject[s] its ulterior reductionism and would
modify its typology of superior and inferior (but determining) struc-
tures." 19
Then, in some extraordinary passages, Thompson brilliantly elab-
orates the neo-Marxist conception of legal ideology as an autonomous
instrument of social control:
The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its func-
tion as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from
gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.
... [Moreover,] it was inherent in the very nature of the me-
dium which [the 18th-century gentry] had selected for their own
self-defence that [the law] could not be reserved for the exclusive
use only of their own class. ...
The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great
deal more than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in
profound ways, the behaviour of the powerful, and mystify the
powerless. They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at
the same time, they may curb that power and check its intru-
sions." 20
What is disappointing about Thompson's book is that he rarely
applies these thoughts to the historical materials themselves. Instead,
the book's central thrust is to expose the mystifying functions of the
law and to strip away its claim to class neutrality. The basic strategy
of its argument is precisely to engage in the sort of reductionism that
Thompson so severely (and perhaps self-critically) finally deplores.
I do not wish to be understood as arguing that historians should
abandon the task of exposing the mystifying functions of law. Far too
little of this presently is done by American legal historians, who as a
18. Id. at 260.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 263-65.
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group already tend toward an excessively reverential and apologetic
attitude towards law.2 1 I wish only to emphasize, along with Thomp-
son, that we will never completely understand the historical functions
of the rule of law if we continue simply to pile on evidence of the
hypocritical character of its claims to political neutrality.
Thompson, however, takes a surprising and disturbing further step,
if I read him correctly. "I am insisting," he writes,
only upon the obvious point, which some modem Marxists have
overlooked, that there is a difference between arbitrary power
and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities
which may be concealed beneath this law. But the rule of law
itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the
defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to
me to be an unqualified human good. To deny or belittle this
good is, in this dangerous century when the resources and pre-
tensions of power continue to enlarge, a desperate error of in-
tellectual abstraction.22
Unless we are prepared to succumb to Hobbesian pessimism "in
this dangerous century," I do not see how a Man of the Left can
describe the rule of law as "an unqualified human good"! It un-
doubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent
exercise. It creates formal equality-a not inconsiderable virtue-but it
promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that
radically separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from
outcomes. By promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own
advantage. And it ratifies and legitimates an adversarial, competitive,
and atomistic conception of human relations.
This system of law may prove to be all that we can hope for in this
desperate century. It may be true that restraint on power (and simul-
taneously on its benevolent exercise) is about all that we can hope to
accomplish in this world. But we should never forget that a "legalist"
consciousness that excludes "result-oriented" jurisprudence as contrary
to the rule of law also inevitably discourages the pursuit of substantive
justice. So can we say that the rule of law is an "unqualified human
good"? Only if Hitler, Stalin, and all of the other horrors of this
century have forced us finally to accept the Hobbesian vision of the
state and human nature on which our present conceptions of the rule
of law ultimately rest. It is a conservative doctrine. Perhaps at 50 years
of age Professor Thompson should be allowed to pronounce its virtues.
21. See Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal His-
tory, 17 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 275 (1973).
22. E. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at 266.
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